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Abstract  
Sustainable biofuels certification is an example of hybrid governance that locates 
authority, implementation and enforcement by state and non-state actors across 
borders. The emerging concept of “transnational environmental law” seeks to explore 
such forms of regulation beyond the state. This article argues that “transnational 
environmental law” provides a holistic perspective that breaks free of bounded notions 
of “law” and the “state” to capture the realities of social ordering (to address 
environmental challenges) at the periphery, instead of the traditional political centres of 
states and international organisations. However, this does not mean that the 
involvement or influence of states is diminished in any way. In the case of sustainable 
biofuels certification, states play an important role in creating incentives for other actors 
such as the market and civil society to play a role in global environmental regulation and 
orchestrating such multi-actor and multi-level regulatory arrangements.  
Introduction 
From the perspective of international environmental law (IEL), it would appear 
that the international community has done little, if anything at all, to address the 
environmental and socio-economic problems associated with industrial-scale biofuels 
production.1 The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) has produced 
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1
 These problems have been well-explored in the literature; they include rampant deforestation and consequent 
biodiversity loss and ecological damage, “land grabs” and displacement of rural communities and indigenous 
peoples from their homes, and the controversial possibility that the production of biofuels releases more 
some excellent and thorough research.2 The World Bank and the Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) have also addressed biofuels but within their 
institutional mandates of macro-economic policy and food security.3 As international 
organisations which are the classical arenas of international law-making, the UNEP, 
FAO and the World Bank have not advocated an international legal response in the 
form of a multilateral environmental treaty (MEA). Neither is an MEA the appropriate 
solution. Given the requirement of state consent and the need to create incentives for 
wide participation by states, MEAs typically feature rules and standards of the lowest 
common denominator cast in vague and legally non-binding language (i.e., that “States 
should endeavor…” instead of “States shall…”).4 Compliance has always been 
problematic because enforcement mechanisms in MEAs are typically weak or non-
existent.5 “Treaty congestion” is also a real concern.6 Neither customary international 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
greenhouse gases than the production of conventional transportation fuels like diesel and petroleum thereby fully 
running against one of the key policy rationales for promoting biofuels. See Towards Sustainable Production and 
Use of Resources: Assessing Biofuels, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2009 [“UN Report”]; 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Biofuels: Ethical issues (April 2011), available online: www.nuffieldbioethics.org 
(accessed on 9 April 2013); Jerry M. Melillo et al, Unintended Environmental Consequences of a Global Biofuels 
Program, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change,  Report No. 168 (January 2009); Claude 
Mandil and Adnan Shihab-Eldin, Assessment of Biofuels Potential and Limitations (International Energy Forum, 
February 2010); A. Ajanovic, “Biofuels versus food production: Does biofuels production increase food prices?” 
(2011) 36 Energy 2070-2076.  Searchinger, T., Heimlich, R., Houghton, R. A., Dong, F., Elobeid, A., Fabiosa, J., 
Tokgoz, S., Hayes, D. and Yu, T.-H., “Use Of US Croplands For Biofuels Increases Greenhouse Gases Through 
Emissions From Land Use Change” (2008) 319 Science 1238-1240. 
2
 UN Report; The UNEP was one of the three organisers of the following research project, Franke, Bernd; 
Reinhardt, Guido; Malavelle, Jérôme; Faaij, André; Fritsche, Uwe, Global Assessments and Guidelines for 
Sustainable Liquid Biofuels,  (A GEF Targeted Research Project. Heidelberg/Paris/Utrecht/Darmstadt, 29 February 
2012), online: 
http://www.unep.org/bioenergy/Portals/48107/doc/activities/GEF%20Liquid%20Biofuel%20Project.pdf (accessed 
on 9 April 2013).  
3
 See M. Kojima et al, Considering Trade Policies for Liquid Biofuels, World Bank, Renewable Energy Special Report 
004/07, May 2007, available online: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/Considering_trade_policies_for_liquid_biofuels.pdf  
(accessed on 1 April 2013); Aziz Elbehri, Anna Segerstedt and Pascal Liu, Biofuels and the sustainability challenge: A 
global assessment of sustainability issues, trends and policies for biofuels and related feedstocks (FAO, 2013), 
online: http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/i3126e/i3126e.pdf (accessed on 1 April 2013).  
4
 B. Simma, “From Bilateralism to Community Interest”, (1994) 250 Recueil des cours 221; D.M. Johnston, Consent 
and Commitment in the World Community: The Classification and Analysis of International Instruments 
(Transnational Publishing, 1997), pages 62–63; Scott Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: Strategies of 
Environmental Treaty-Making (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).  
5
 For an alternative view that emphasises facilitation of compliance and legitimacy as an important factor in 
increasing a treaty regime’s “compliance pull”, see Jutta Brunnée, “Enforcement Mechanisms in International Law 
and International Environmental Law” in in UIrich Beyerlin et al, eds., Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: A Dialogue Between Practitioners and Academia (Martinus Nijhoff, 2005).  
law nor the general principles of law offers much guidance too. In any event, they will 
only offer guidance in a meaningful way through litigation which is itself a poor response 
to global environmental challenges.7 In short, by focusing on classical IEL which 
comprises of treaties, general principles and customary international law, it would 
appear that the law offers anaemic responses to the environmental destruction and 
social injustice engendered by industrial biofuels production. 
However, the picture is markedly different the moment we expand our visual field 
beyond the state (including intergovernmental organisations which are created by 
states) and the corpus of IEL created by states. This expansion can take place on two 
levels. On one level, we could expand our visual field in disciplinary terms: in addition to 
the legal framework, there is a rapidly growing body of political science literature that 
seeks to examine the causes and consequences of regulation by non-state actors 
including industry associations and networks of technical experts. Cutler, Haufler and 
Porter’s pioneering work on private authority used a series of in-depth studies of 
particular cases of international private regulation to shed light on the theoretical and 
empirical questions: Why would firms cooperate to establish frameworks to govern their 
conduct, for example, regarding labour conditions and environmental safety? How do 
such forms of private regulation operate and how do they gain authority?8 Subsequent 
works by Hall and Biersteker, Buthe, Green and Bartley, to name a few, shed further 
light on these questions.9 Additionally, scholars including Strange, Ruggie and Sassen 
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 Edith Brown Weiss, “International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World 
Order” (1993) 81 Georgetown Law Journal 675.  
7
  For resounding criticism of the International Court of Justice’s lack of aptitude in adjudicating environmental 
disputes, see the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay 
(Argentina v. Uruguay), online: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15879.pdf (last visited on 1 April 2013); for 
discussion of environmental litigation in international tribunals, see Tim Stephens, International Courts and 
Environmental Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
8
 A. C. Cutler, V. Haufler and T. Porter, Private authority and international affairs (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1999). 
9
 R. B. Hall and T. J. Biersteker,  The emergence of private authority in global governance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002); T. Büthe, “Governance through private authority? Non-state actors in world politics” 
(2004) 58(1) Journal of International Affairs 281-290; T. Buthe, “Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A 
(P)Review” (2010) 12(3) Business and Politics, Article 2; J.F. Green, "Private authority in global environmental 
politics: Delegation to non-state actors in multilateral environmental treaties" Presented at the American Political 
Science Association (2008), online: http://iea.uoregon.edu/pages/publications/2008-Green_Delegation_APSA.pdf 
(accessed on 9 June 2013); T. Bartley, “Transnational private regulation in practice: The limits of forest and labor 
standards certification in Indonesia" (2010)12(3) Business and Politics.  
have explored (and hold differing views of) the effect of the rise of private regulation on 
public regulatory authority.10 Whytock has questioned if private regulation can operate 
effectively in the absence of stable and reliable domestic legal systems given the 
limitations of reputational enforcement mechanisms.11 On the other end of the spectrum 
is Strange’s famous proclamation that “[w]here states were once the masters of 
markets, now it is the markets which, on many crucial issues, are the masters over the 
governments of states. And the declining authority of states is reflected in a growing 
diffusion of authority to other institutions and associations…”12  
On another level, the expansion of the visual field has been marked by the move 
from IEL to transnational environmental law (TEL). This article shall focus on what is at 
stake in this move. The underlying premise is that a single-minded focus on the 
traditional preoccupations of IEL discourse such as the emergence of customary 
international law and the case-law of the international tribunals creates a blind spot on 
the area between the “domestic” and the “international”. This single-minded focus that 
IEL scholars have harks back to adherence to a conception of law that is invariably 
bound to state sovereignty. If one is open to making the conceptual move away from 
such formalistic notions of law, one “opens up” the necessary space to consider novel 
forms of governing. Many IEL scholars have made such a conceptual move to expand 
their visual field by drawing on the insights and methodologies of disciplines ranging 
from international relations to new institutional economics.13 This article argues that this 
has led to the emerging concept of TEL, whether or not scholars allude to it intuitively 
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 S. Strange, The retreat of the state: The diffusion of power in the world economy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); J. G. Ruggie, “Reconstituting the global public domain—issues, actors, and practices" 
(2004) 10(4) European Journal of International Relations 499-531; S. Sassen, Losing control?: Sovereignty in an age 
of globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).  
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 C.A. Whytock, “Private-Public Interaction in Global Governance: The Case of Transnational Commercial 
Arbitration" (2010) 12(3) Business and Politics, Article 10, pages 17-22.  
12
 S. Strange, The retreat of the state: The diffusion of power in the world economy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), page 4.  
13
 Economists were amongst the first scholars to theorise the transnational dimensions of trade and culture in the 
world economy that have evolved throughout history; for example, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1848) Das 
kommunistische Manifest (Berlin, Dietz). This body of work built on and complemented work by political scientists 
like Jonah D. Levy and Samuel P. Huntington on the influence of globalisation on national and regional political 
economies. It soon became clear, as this body of research grew, that it was necessary or useful to develop a 
concept that could capture the “space between the ‘international’ and the ‘national’” (Gralf-Peter Calliess and Peer 
Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational Private Law (Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2010, page 13).  
(/implicitly) or consciously (/explicitly).14 At the same time, TEL can also be seen to be 
an extended application of “transnational law” to the context of environmental 
regulation.15  
With an expanded visual field, it could be observed, for example, that normative 
rules are being made and implemented by corporations and environmental non-
governmental organisations in forums that have impact across national borders.16 We 
would also observe that State X’s environmental law can have profound legal and 
regulatory impacts on State Y and may even be more effective in improving the latter’s 
environmental record in its biofuels production activities than an MEA. The advocacy of 
an “expanded visual field” approach is not new. In fact, a vast majority of IEL 
scholarship, particularly that of American scholars, adopts an inter-disciplinary approach 
towards IEL. There is a shared awareness that the state-centric doctrines of IEL are ill-
suited to theorizing many modern developments such as the “green economy”.17 A 
retort could be that such developments fall outside the purview of the “law” so it is not a 
question of the limitations of IEL but that IEL scholars are dealing with “non-law”. 
However, this would be a simplistic retort. Scholars theorising about domestic law in its 
wider socio-economic and political context (broadly known as sociology of law 
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 Examples of the former include Hari M. Osofsky, “Climate Change Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?” (2007) 
26A Stanford Environmental Law Journal & 43A Stanford Journal of International Law 181 (joint issue); Hari M. 
Osofsky, “Climate Change and Dispute Resolution Processes” in International Law in the Era of Climate Change 
(Rosemary Rayfuse & Shirley V. Scott, eds., Edward Elgar, 2012);  Joanne Scott, “From Brussels with Love: The 
Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the Chemistry of Regulatory Attraction” (2009) 57(4) The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 897-942. Examples of the latter include David M. Ong, “From ‘International’ to 
‘Transnational’ Environmental Law? A Legal Assessment of the Contribution of the ‘Equator Principles’ to 
International Environmental Law” (2010) 79 Nordic Journal of International Law 35–74; the articles in the inaugural 
issue of Transnational Environmental Law, published in April 2012, online: 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=TEL (accessed on 1 April 2013).  
15
 Julia Black defines “regulation” as “the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according 
to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, and 
which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification”; Julia 
Black, “Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems: Examples from UK Financial Services Regulation” (2003) Public Law 
at 63, 65.  
16
 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics 
(Cornell University Press, 1998).  
17
 E. Morgera & A. Savaresi, “A Conceptual and Legal Perspective on the Green Economy” (2013) 22 Review of 
European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 14–28, doi: 10.1111/reel.12016; for a highly 
compelling critique of the notion of “sustainable development” in IEL, see Donald K. Anton, “The 2012 United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development and the Future of International Environmental Protection” (2012) 
7(1) Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development 64–72.  
scholarship) faced a similar battle more than two decades ago. Although the 
sociological study of law coexists uneasily with the established discipline of law, the 
latter has changed in important respects to accommodate the perspectives of the 
former.18 “Law in context” is now a widely accepted approach towards legal analysis; 
reflexive law and “new governance” recognise that “law” today goes beyond rules 
backed by sanctions and punishment and the state does not maintain a monopoly over 
rule-making but nonetheless retains a significant role in the modern regulatory state.19  
Similarly, the boundary between “law” and “non-law” in IEL is a contested one. 
There is a complex of norms, actors and processes that have developed at multiple 
“sites” and “levels” beyond the simple dichotomy of the Westphalian duo of municipal 
domestic law and inter-state law. To an extent, this “law” versus “non-law” contention 
reflects a broader, enduring debate over normative pluralism and the concept of law in 
legal theory. While the concept of “law” remains open to contestation, it is essential to 
have a “working definition” to clarify the parameters of discussion in this article. The 
definition has to be sufficiently open-ended to guide inquiry, and not close off inquiry 
before it begins by conclusively specifying the nature of the object of study (the makings 
of a tautological debate!).20 As such, in this article, “legal norms” refer to norms that lay 
out behavioural prescriptions issued by an authoritative source in written form; they can 
be formally binding or not; and they can be backed by dispute settlement and 
enforcement systems or not.21 Admittedly, this definition is broad enough to include 
village custom and religious rules; what distinguishes legal norms is that the behavioural 
prescriptions are ultimately intended to achieve policy goals of the state. The state 
indirectly or directly taps on different networks, pathways and sites of normative 
influence to regulate society. In this manner, law takes on a far wider, more diffused, 
more complex role in the modern nation state and global society.  
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 Roger Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law: An Introduction (United Kingdom: Butterworths, 1992), page 8.  
19
 See discussion in Part III below.  
20
 This takes a leaf from Cotterrell’s distinction between a definition of law and a model of law; Roger Cotterrell, 
The Sociology of Law: An Introduction (United Kingdom: Butterworths, 1992), page 38. 
21
 G. Shaffer, “Transnational Legal Process and State Change” (2012) 37(2) Law & Social Inquiry 229-264, at page 
234. [Transnational Legal Process and State Change] 
This article examines a particular biofuels regulatory regime through the lens of 
TEL. The regulatory regime that the European Union (EU) has set up to govern the 
production of biofuels from “the field to the tank” relies heavily on a novel combination of 
regulatory approaches. These approaches include delegation of regulatory authority to 
non-state market-based certification schemes and audit firms, use of market access to 
ratchet up environmental standards in exporting countries (alternatively, attaching 
environmental condition precedents to biofuel exports into the European market), and 
legal unilateralism. Traditional IEL discourse will dismiss such regulatory innovation as 
irrelevant despite the clear implications that the EU scheme will have for the 
international system of managing natural resources. Using the concepts of TEL, 
however, unlocks the potential to analyse the implications of emerging forms of non-
traditional governing in the international arena.  
Part II of this article provides a fuller elaboration of TEL. If we are “still in search 
of transnational law, including the very concept of ‘transnational law’, and not yet at the 
stage of fattening it out (as concept)”, the same is true of TEL.22 This article is a humble 
attempt to outline the contours of the emerging concept of TEL. Part III analyses the 
EU’s sustainable biofuels regulatory regime as a case study of TEL in practice and 
advances two arguments. First, the TEL perspective provides a more nuanced role of 
the state in global environmental governance than that provided by IEL. The case study 
of the EU sustainable biofuels regime shows that the state plays an important role of 
orchestrating multi-actor initiatives and also creates TEL through unilateral action (as 
opposed to multilateral negotiations). Secondly, TEL in the EU biofuels context raises 
two broad questions concerning legitimacy. The first question is whether it is legitimate 
for economically powerful state actors to use trade-based measures to unilaterally direct 
international policy. The second question is whether there are any satisfactory 
responses to the claim that private regulation (that is, by certification schemes and 
auditors) is non-democratic and therefore illegitimate. This article argues that 
unilateralism can be legitimate if due process and non-discrimination norms laid down in 
international law are adhered to. As for the second claim, this article takes the view that 
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 Craig Scott, “’Transnational Law’ as Proto-Concept: Three Conceptions” (2009) 10(7) German Law Journal 859-
876, page 864. [Craig Scott] 
private regulation is not more undemocratic than international law. The attempts by 
certification schemes to be, for example, more inclusive of a wide array of actors from 
developed and developing countries are pragmatic efforts to build legitimacy when there 
is no agreed-upon notion of “democracy” in the transnational arena. Part IV concludes 
that broadening our horizons beyond IEL, TEL provides a small but useful “vocabulary” 
for scholars to highlight and theorise alternative regulatory options and innovations such 
as public-private partnerships, market-based certification schemes, the use of market 
access to promote environmental goals, and so on. The use of the term “vocabulary” is 
a deliberate choice as there is, as yet, no discourse or well-developed methodology 
associated with TEL. It is not an established concept. However, TEL appears to be a 
promising avenue for breaking free of the shackles of state-centred ideas of law to 
capture the realities of social ordering today and there is potential for developing it as a 
methodological approach for environmental law scholars. 
 
Part II: What is Transnational Environmental Law? 
Starting with the proposition that TEL has its origins in the ‘transnational law’ 
literature and is emerging from efforts by scholars to borrow and apply ‘transnational 
law’ to the field of environmental studies, the exploration of what TEL is begins here 
with some preliminary observations of how “transnational law” has been conceptualised. 
From the outset, it must be noted that there is a vast (and expanding) body of 
transnational law literature as scholars from different fields ranging from commercial law 
to administrative law have sought to engage with the concept of transnational law as 
part of their observations of the impact of globalisation on discrete areas of law.23 These 
preliminary observations are therefore introductory in nature, barely skimming the 
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 For a small sample, see, Roy Goode, Herbert Kronke, Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2007); Benedict Kingsbury et al, “Global Governance as Administration – National and 
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surface of the debates in the literature; the aim here is merely to capture the salient 
aspects of transnational law which shape the conceptual contours of TEL.  
 As a starting point, there is no reason why one ought not to begin with Jessup’s 
oft-quoted passage from his Storrs Lectures on Jurisprudence just over fifty years ago 
at Yale Law School as many scholars have done in trying to get a grip on the use of the 
term “transnational law”.  
I shall use, instead of “international law”, the term “transnational law” to include 
all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Both 
public and private international law are included, as are other rules which do not 
wholly fit into such standard categories. 
Philip Jessup, Transnational Law 136 (1956)  
It is clear that Jessup’s conception of “transnational law” was a broad 
category that includes public international law, private international law and other 
rules that governs actions or events (i.e., physical occurrences) that have elements 
in more than one jurisdiction.24 An example is a chemical spill in a river that runs 
between two states and therefore causing pollution in more than one jurisdiction. In 
Scott’s illuminating discussion of transnational law (which he views to be at such an 
early stage of emergence that he calls it a “proto-concept”), he presents three 
different but not necessarily mutually exclusive conceptions that are extrapolated 
from Jessup’s formulation. First, “transnationalized legal traditionalism” focuses on 
the first sentence of Jessup’s premise. The “law” as we know it, that must deal with 
various transnational phenomena, comprises of public international law and 
domestic law. “On this account, there is not- and no need for – something distinct 
called “transnational law” for such ‘law’ would invariably be given shape and be 
                                                           
24
 Public international law came into existence with the rise of sovereign states in the seventeenth century. It is 
commonly viewed as the body of law that governs relations between states (for example, the law governing 
diplomatic relations) and that which arises from joint efforts by states to address issues of common concern (for 
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international law is also known as “conflict of laws”).   
permitted to exist only as the combined functioning of public international law and 
domestic legal systems, and their mutually regulated interactions”.25  
The second approach is dubbed “transnationalized legal decisionism”. As the 
name suggests, this approach conceives of transnational law as the outcome of 
legal decision-making processes that have employed both domestic and 
international law to provide a body of potentially applicable rules to resolve a 
transnational issue, problem or dispute.26 This approach can be seen in the way 
constitutional courts engage in dialogue, whether physically through meetings of 
judges to exchange insights or metaphorically through references in judgments to 
relevant case law in other jurisdictions, and which has been theorised within what 
some would call the transnational legal process school.27  
Scott’s third conception is dubbed “transnational socio-legal pluralism” and 
captures an approach that has generated much literature. It is also within this 
conception (and “transnationalized legal decisionism”) that TEL appears to fit. This 
approach sees transnational law as being somewhat autonomous of domestic law 
and international law (including private international law). It is imagined to occupy its 
own normative sphere, the nature of which is “constructed” (by interacting legal, 
policy and moral discourses) instead of being “found” or “given”. The “other rules”, 
referred to in the final line of Jessup’s framing, are seen by adherents of the 
“transnational socio-legal pluralism” approach as the truly transnational rules.28 One 
of the earliest works to theorise about the emergence of these “other rules” that do 
not fall neatly within the established categories (of public international law, private 
international law and domestic law) was Teubner’s stage-setting chapter in Global 
Law without a State. The title of the chapter, “‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in 
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 See, for example, Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Judicial Globalization” (2000) 40 Virginia Journal of International Law 
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the World Society” pays homage to Eugen Ehrlich’s concept of the living law. 
According to Ehrlich, law was not to be found in the political centres of power but in 
the every-day customs, habits and practices which the common folk adhered to.29 
Transposing Ehrlich’s insight that “[t]he center of gravity of legal development 
therefore from time immemorial has not lain in the activity of the state, but in society 
itself, and must be sought there at the present time” to the plane of the 
contemporary global economy, Teubner argued that “global law will grow mainly 
from the social peripheries, not from the political centres of nation-states and 
international institutions”.30 Using lex mercatoria, the law of economic transactions 
that has developed to mediate between enterprises with little or no involvement of 
state authorities since medieval times, as the quintessential example of “global law 
without the state”, Teubner argued that lex mercatoria “breaks a double taboo about 
the necessary connections between law and state”.31 First, that merely private 
orders and actors can produce valid law without state authorisation. Secondly, that 
such “law” as produced by lex mercatoria claims to be valid across national borders. 
Given lex mercatoria’s break with tradition, it cannot be theorised using positivist 
theories of law.32 Resort must therefore be made, Teubner argues, to theories of 
legal pluralism which treat political, legal and social production of norms on an equal 
footing.33 According to legal pluralist theories, legally non-binding norms that are 
generated by, for example, institutions formed by firms and non-governmental 
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 For discussion of Ehrlich’s “living law” concept, see David Nelken, “Eugen Ehrlich, Living Law and Plural 
Legalities” (2008) 9(2) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 443–471.  
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 The first quotation in the sentence is from Ehrlich, 1936: 390, reproduced on the same page where the second 
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 Teubner, page 11. For an excellent introduction to the historical development of lex mercatoria, see Alec Stone 
Sweet, “The new Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance” (2006) Vol. 13(5) Journal of European Public 
Policy 627-646. 
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33
 For a convincing critique of the lack of continuity between “global legal pluralism” and the older anthropological 
and socio-legal accounts of legal pluralism, see William Twining, “Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global 
Perspective” (2010) Duke Journal of International and Comparative Law 473-517.  
organisations may be viewed as “law” for participating firms.34 Distinctions between 
“transnational law” and “global law” have been drawn and Teubner’s work has come 
to be regarded as closer to the latter than the former, but Teubner continues to 
influence the way scholars think and theorise about transnational law.  
Shaffer draws the following distinction between global law and transnational 
law: Global law refers to universal legal norms that are created and diffused by 
states and private actors. These universal norms need not be produced as a result 
of agreement by states, but claim to be universal in application or have universal 
validity.35 Transnational law, on the other hand, does not make such claims of 
universality. Transnational law can include traditional international law (both public 
and private) “but also encompass legal rules and norms that have effects across 
borders without any binding agreement among states, whether they are created by 
international organizations, intergovernmental networks, or private actors, and 
whether they are of a hard or soft law nature”.36  
Shaffer further distinguishes between two conceptual facets of transnational 
law. The first, “Transnational Law Applying to Transnational Situations”, refer to law 
that targets transnational events, activities and situations that involve more than one 
jurisdiction. Jessup’s formulation and Craig’s three conceptions of transnational law 
are examples of the use of the term “transnational law” in this first sense. Shaffer’s 
second conceptualisation captures the notion of the creation and diffusion of norms 
by casting the spotlight on “…the transnational production of legal norms and 
institutional forms and their migration across borders, regardless of whether they 
address transnational activities or purely national ones”.37 This second conception 
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also emphasises the role of transnational actors “…be they institutions or networks 
of public or private actors…in constructing and diffusing legal norms”.38  
We now shift the focus to TEL with resort to Shaffer’s conceptualisations. The 
application of Shaffer’s first conception to the environmental sphere is not 
controversial: transnationalism flows from the nature of environmental problems as 
usually being cross-border. Environmental disputes often arise from trans-boundary 
harm such as plumes of air pollutants from State X to State Y, or a chemical spill 
that originates in a river within State X but causes ecological devastation further 
downstream in the river basin shared by a number of states. Such trans-frontier 
environmental disputes are the raison d'être of early IEL.  
It is Shaffer’s second conception that yields more interesting insights for 
sketching the contours of TEL. At the risk of repetition, we can say at this juncture 
that TEL comprises of (1) law that applies to trans-boundary situations whereby the 
legal norms can derive from domestic legal systems, public international law, or 
private ordering such as mediated settlements between a polluter and the affected 
communities; (2) the study of how legal norms are created and diffused by 
institutions and networks of actors which exercise influence beyond a jurisdiction 
(and may be public, private or hybrid in nature) to induce improved environmental 
performance in target states, industries and communities with close connections with 
the environmental resource at stake (for example, indigenous peoples and forests); 
(3) the study of the outcomes of such patterns of norm creation and diffusion and (4) 
the study of normative concerns that arise from transnational legal structures such 
as their legitimacy.39 It should also be noted that norms do not need to be 
“environmental” in the sense that they are created primarily in response to 
environmental regulatory needs in order to be deemed relevant for study from a TEL 
perspective. Resort to “other” bodies of law such as human rights law and 
international trade law to achieve environmental objectives such as protecting an 
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endangered species of sea turtle is usually a strategic decision. That in itself justifies 
attention because valid questions arise, for example, whether the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) is the appropriate forum for pursuing environmental goals.40  
PART III: The EU’s Quest for Sustainable Biofuels  
In this Part III, we will examine the biofuels governance framework that has 
been put in place in the EU as an example of TEL in practice. At this juncture, some 
background information to provide a contextual understanding of this “sustainable 
biofuels” regime will be useful.  
Biofuels have been around for more than a century.41 In the 2000s, a conflux of 
factors created the biggest window of opportunity for the commercial development of 
biofuels. These three factors are climate change, energy security and rural 
development. Touted as a “triple-win” silver bullet that could help lower greenhouse gas 
emissions, enhance energy security and promote rural development, governments of 
developed and developing countries alike jumped on the biofuels bandwagon.42 Every 
biofuels programme to date has been supported by extensive governmental intervention 
in the form of research grants, laws and regulations, subsidies and import tariffs 
because biofuels have historically been more expensive to produce compared to 
petroleum fuels.43  
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In the EU, the year 2003 witnessed the launch of more aggressive policies to 
encourage the development of the biofuels industry.44 The focus during this period was 
on stimulating biofuels demand and supply, and little attention was paid to the 
environmental and socio-economic effects. Between 2005 and 2008, biofuels incentive 
programmes in the United States, the EU and some two dozen other countries 
contributed to world food markets experiencing the largest price shocks in thirty years.45  
The European Commission soon came under mounting pressure from scientists, 
environmental and human rights non-governmental organisations, and some member 
states (e.g. Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom) to address the 
environmental and food security dimensions of biofuels.46 Subsequently, to allay these 
concerns about the environmental harm that biofuels production could cause in 
developing countries, the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive (RED) included the 
“sustainability criteria” for biofuels.47 Briefly, these criteria specify that biofuels must 
provide at least 35% greenhouse gas emission savings compared to fossil fuels and 
must not come from crops cultivated on land with a high biodiversity value or on former 
peat land.48 While a type of biofuel can be imported into the EU even if it does not meet 
the sustainability standards, compliance is required in order for the biofuel in question to 
count towards attainment of EU or national renewable energy obligations or to be 
eligible for financial support.49 In this regard, the sustainability criteria are not legally 
mandatory requirements but exporters that fail to meet these requirements will 
encounter restricted access to the EU market.   
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The interesting features of this attempt to ensure that biofuels consumed 
within the EU meet some requirements, albeit limited, concerning ecological 
sustainability, lie in the compliance framework and the underlying policy commitment 
to “greening market access”. Using the second prong of the above-mentioned scope 
of TEL as a guide, our attention is drawn to how the sustainability criteria is found in 
an EU directive, implemented by the European Commission through a multi-layered 
network of public, private or hybrid institutions and actors which diffuse these norms, 
and induce regulatory action (that will lead to compliance with the sustainability 
criteria) by actors located outside the EU.  
 
The Compliance Framework 
The Commission does not directly ensure that a biofuel product satisfies the 
sustainability criteria.50 The task of “certifying” biofuels as being compliant is delegated 
to certification schemes that have been developed by business associations, non-profit 
organisations and governments usually working in partnership. These initiatives are 
usually labelled “roundtables” or “stewardship councils” to signal their multi-stakeholder 
nature.51  
 
The Commission “benchmarks” these certification schemes against the RED 
sustainability criteria to determine the extent to which a certification scheme addresses 
the sustainability criteria and the robustness of its verification system. Subsequently, a 
producer or importer (in the Commission’s language, an “economic operator”) can rely 
on certification by a recognised scheme to demonstrate compliance with the RED 
sustainability criteria. To demonstrate independence and transparency, a certification 
scheme, in turn, relies on auditing by third-party entities such as accreditation bodies 
before it affixes its “approved” seal on the biofuel product. As these accreditation bodies 
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are separate entities from those involved in devising the rules and implementing the 
certification scheme, they are cast as independent arbiters of the verification process 
and therefore fit to “regulate the regulators”.52 
 
The responsibility of monitoring and verification is therefore divided amongst 
myriad actors to ensure that a biofuel is “sustainable” from the time the feedstock is 
produced in the fields to the time it reaches the consumer in the EU market. This form of 
regulation is also known as “meta-standard regulation” whereby “[i]nstead of requiring 
producers to be certified to the Meta-Standard [i.e., the RED sustainability criteria in this 
case] directly, compliance with the Meta-Standard can be achieved through certification 
to existing standards which have proven to provide a sufficient guarantee that (most of) 
the…criteria of the Meta-Standard are complied with”.53    
 
The State as Orchestrator  
 
Building on Abbott and Snidal’s ideas about the emergence of “Transnational 
New Governance”, the following discussion will examine how this unique compliance 
framework is an example of how the EU is proactively employing New Governance 
techniques at the transnational level to achieve desired regulatory goals. Abbott and 
Snidal acknowledge that the “mapping” of Old Governance from the domestic level onto 
the international level is not without difficulties, mainly because the international system 
does not have a hierarchically superior “state” that has the authority to adopt mandatory 
regulations or to impose sanctions.54 However, Old Governance at the domestic and 
international levels shares similar characteristics. At the domestic level, Old 
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Governance refers to the state governing regulated activities via “command and control” 
and the main enforcement mechanism consists of coercive sanctions. Old Governance 
relies on “hard law”. The Old Governance view of societal actors is that they are self-
interested and unaccountable, and therefore incapable of self-regulation or playing any 
meaningful role in state regulation.55 At the international level, Old Governance 
comprises of treaty law (“hard law”) and an array of issue-specific inter-governmental 
organisations (IGOs) which are created and governed by their member states. Albeit to 
a lesser degree compared to the domestic level, international Old Governance also 
comprises of centralized governance (by the IGOs) whose legitimacy is based on formal 
authority and bureaucratic expertise.56  
 
The New Governance model of regulation is difficult to define precisely but it can 
be understood to refer to a diverse range of innovative regulatory practices that stand in 
contradistinction to Old Governance.57 The salient distinction between Old Governance 
and New Governance is the differing role that the state plays in regulation; all other 
characteristics flow from this primary distinction. The weakness of the state is often 
seen to be the main reason for the rise of domestic New Governance.58 New 
Governance incorporates a decentralized range of public and private institutions and 
actors into the regulatory system by, for example, encouraging self-regulation by 
industry, relies on this range of actors for regulatory expertise, and makes use of “soft 
law” (for example, codes of conduct) to complement or substitute mandatory “hard 
law”.59 In New Governance, the state remains a significant actor but it behaves less as a 
“commander” and more as an “orchestrator” that facilitates and directs collaborative 
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regulation by the network of actors.60 The state often initiates New Governance 
programmes as it recognises New Governance as an important regulatory tool and uses 
it proactively.61 Therefore, behind all New Governance programmes lurks the hand of 
the state. For example, the state can require private actors and institutions to abide by 
due process norms/ administrative law and can retain the threat of introducing 
mandatory regulation should self-regulation prove to be unsatisfactory.62  
 
Abbott and Snidal argue that the expanding array of private, public-private and 
IGO initiatives such as eco-labelling schemes, the United Nations Global Compact and 
the chemical sector’s “Responsible Care” self-regulation programme (which they refer to 
as forms of “regulatory standard-setting”)”is developing into a system of Transnational 
New Governance for business. As in the New Governance model, these schemes form 
“a decentralized but increasingly dense and interlinked constellation of private and 
public-private arrangements…which surrounds and complements traditional state-based 
regulatory structures”.63 Dingwerth has suggested that in the absence of a “zone of 
agreement” amongst states to conclude MEAs, these private and hybrid public-private 
rule-making processes have entered to fill the gap as a result of the failure of public 
rule-making.64 Using different terminology, Cashore conceptualizes the expanding array 
of private governance initiatives as “non-state-market-driven (NSMD) governance”.65 
NSMD governance systems such as forest certification derive their authority not from 
the state but from the manipulation of global market forces and consumer preferences. 
The state does not exercise its sovereign authority to require compliance with the rules 
generated by NSMD governance processes, although it can seek to influence and 
shape NSMD rules like any other interest group.66 It can be argued that the EU biofuels 
scheme is an example of NSMD governance whereby the state is acting in ways 
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consistent with NSMD governance such as implementing policies that create market 
demand for certified biofuels, but not using its sovereign authority to require adherence 
with the sustainability criteria. Business actors will seek certification because they wish 
to access the EU market, not because certification is required by law.  
 
 Abbott and Snidal advance the normative argument that states and IGOs ought 
to promote Transnational New Governance to fill the gaps of international Old 
Governance. However, Transnational New Governance will take off only if states and 
IGOs provide the necessary “orchestration and support”.67 “Orchestration includes a 
wide range of directive and facilitative measures designed to convene, empower, 
support, and steer, public and private actors engaged in regulatory activities”.68 They 
point out that the greatest current weakness of Transnational New Governance is the 
lack of orchestration.69 As the above description of the EU “sustainable biofuels” 
compliance framework shows, the EU (the “state”) can be said to be engaging in 
“directive orchestration”.70 It is imposing conditions on public benefits and giving state 
endorsement to “approved” schemes to bolster the practice of biofuels eco-labelling. By 
the meta-standard approach, the EU is also performing an important facilitative role of 
encouraging uniformity of standards across competing biofuels certification schemes. 
This reduces excessive multiplicity which encourages “forum-shopping” amongst 
biofuels producers and causes confusion on the part of consumers.71   
 
To point out the obvious, the EU’s resort to Transnational New Governance 
allows it to hedge against some of the legal uncertainties (concerning WTO compliance) 
associated with linking social and environmental standards to trade.72 Further, the 
Commission can hardly claim to have the ability or the resources to police compliance 
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with the RED sustainability criteria in plantations and production plants outside the EU. 
Going back to the concept of TEL, the above discussion shows how the limitations of 
traditional IEL/international Old Governance can be overcome (to a certain extent) by 
resort to transnational regulation. As Krasner has argued, transnational private 
regulation can help governments to escape certain constraints.73 TEL embodies a broad 
understanding of law (in the pluralist sense) and regulation, and includes regulatory 
innovation of the kind commonly associated with New Governance. Most scholars of the 
New Governance school favour a hybrid of Old Governance and New Governance, in 
which the state maintains a baseline of minimum mandatory regulation, regulates those 
actors which do not subscribe to New Governance, and uses New Governance to 
implement or supplement mandatory law.74 This is an acknowledgment of the significant 
role that the state continues to play in regulating even though it is no longer the sole 
locus of authority. Similarly, while TEL recognises the role of the community, private 
individuals and the market in global environmental governance, it by no means 




Inevitably, questions of the legitimacy of TEL are raised. In the context of the EU 
sustainable biofuels regime, two broad questions concerning legitimacy arise. The first 
question concerns the legitimacy of the EU using market access as a policy mechanism 
to unilaterally impose environmental standards on their trading partners.  The other 
question concerns the legitimacy of rule-making, rule promotion and adjudication of 
compliance by private authorities (i.e, the certification schemes and auditors).75 Both 
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types of legitimacy concerns have prompted calls for a “multilateral governance 
framework” for biofuels, the institutional design of which seeks to promote public 
participation, transparency and deliberative decision-making.76 Lima, for example, 
argues that sustainability regulation in the form of voluntary certification schemes and 
the EU sustainability criteria lack transparency and are “…a weak replacement for a 
structured multilateral legal framework as demanded by the principle of the rule of 
law”.77 Both sets of legitimacy concerns will be addressed in turn below.  
 
States are not globally representative; their governments can only speak for the 
common interests of the electorate that put them into power.78 Given the policy 
differences between developed countries and developing ones, the legitimacy of 
developed countries unilaterally directing international policy is questionable.79 It can be 
argued that the EU’s unilateral imposition of environmental standards on other members 
of the international community raises questions of political legitimacy, that is, the 
acceptance and justification of shared rule by a community.80 In this regard, legitimacy 
is “the justification of actions to those whom they affect according to reasons they can 
accept”.81 Justification of authority is, in turn, deemed essential to securing compliance 
or the obedience of the governed. However, this argument could well be set aside as 
erroneously based on a misconception of what the EU is trying to achieve through 
unilateral action. Scott has argued that the ultimate goal of the EU’s resort to trade-
related environmental measures “is not to enforce compliance with EU rules on the part 
of operators situated abroad, but it is on the contrary to galvanise or incentivise 
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regulatory or normative engagement elsewhere”.82 This idea of using market access to 
influence the regulatory policies of trading partners is not new. Vogel’s Trading Up, 
published in 1995, is the seminal work on the concept of ‘the lure of green markets’.83 
Vogel demonstrated how more stringent regulation in a large market led large 
companies to adapt to that regulation, providing them with a comparative advantage 
and creating incentives for these companies to lobby for more stringent regulation in 
other jurisdictions that have yet to do so. The result is what Vogel termed the “California 
effect” – the dissemination of stricter environmental regulation across borders. Vogel 
thereby also demonstrated that unilateral regulatory action by a state exercising market 
power creates TEL (i.e., the creation and diffusion of norms across borders).  
 
 Bernstein has demonstrated that what counts as a legitimate institution varies 
across inter-governmental and non-state institutions.84 His research has shown that 
despite trenchant criticism of the Kyoto Protocol, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change framework continues to be seen as the legitimate forum 
for climate change governance. At the same time, non-state based forms of governance 
are held up to far more stringent requirements of accountability and transparency in 
order to be considered legitimate. A major reason for this difference in attitudes towards 
state-based and non-state based governance structures is that the Kyoto Protocol 
adheres to what legitimacy demands of a MEA – state consent.85 In short, a treaty that 
is the product of agreement amongst equal sovereigns enjoys legitimacy and is 
therefore the ideal type. However, in comparing TEL (based on unilateral action) with 
IEL (based on multilateral negotiations), the comparison is not between an imperfect 
institution and a perfect ideal. The comparison is one between two imperfect institutional 
alternatives. To foster legitimacy, multilateral negotiations require agreement by 
consensus. This permits a single state or a small group of states, especially when there 
are free-rider or collective action issues at stake, to stall negotiations and delay action 
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by the international community. Unilateral action that is applied in a principled manner 
(e.g., in a non-discriminatory manner and subject to due process constraints) may be an 
imperfect but superior alternative to the complete lack of action to promote 
environmental interests.86 In the biofuels context, multilateral negotiations for a 
regulatory framework have not begun, arguably due to the international community’s 
lack of enthusiasm for this approach in light of the long-standing stalemate in 
international climate change treaty negotiations. In this climate of treaty fatigue, TEL 
offers some states (inevitably the economically powerful ones like the EU and the US 
which can leverage on their economic might) a pathway for advancing environmental 
interests.  
 
 It can further be argued that the idea of outright imposition of rules by one actor 
on another (which rightly gives rise to legitimacy concerns) is too simplistic. First, while 
recognizing the vulnerability of export-driven economies to the demands of 
economically powerful markets such as the EU, the former are not entirely powerless 
and defenceless actors who have no choice but to submit in acquiescence to a bully. To 
reiterate the earlier point made by Scott, the use of market access to shape 
transnational environmental policy is to tap into the logic of free markets and rational 
behaviour to create incentives for regulatory action outside the EU when no incentives 
existed before.  
 
Let us take the Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil Scheme (ISPO) as a case in point. 
In 2010, the Indonesian government announced that they will be developing a nation-
wide mandatory certification scheme for the palm oil sector.87 The government gave two 
official reasons for this policy decision.88 First, the conditions imposed by the EU 
sustainability criteria and related to this, the need for Indonesian palm oil to remain 
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competitive in the global commodity markets. By 2010, palm oil had gained a notorious 
international reputation. Transnational environmental activist groups like Greenpeace 
had conducted highly visible public campaigns against multinational companies whose 
well-known consumer products contain palm oil to raise awareness of the damage done 
to Indonesian tropical rainforests by industrial palm oil production (Deforestation in 
Indonesia for palm oil and illegal logging is so rapid that it has been estimated that the 
country’s forests might be destroyed by 2022).89 90 These campaigns succeeded in 
pressuring some global brands to commit towards using only certified (sustainable) 
palm oil in their products and to suspend purchases from Indonesian producers which 
allegedly clear primary forests or peatland to set up palm oil plantations.91 The 
Indonesian government recognized the Indonesian palm oil sector would lose its 
competitive advantage if it continued “business as usual” and ignored these issues.92  
 
Critics may point out that, given the prominence of the Roundtable on Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO) certification scheme, it is curious that the Indonesian government 
elected to develop a new standard rather than promote RSPO certification.93 These 
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critics are likely to dismiss the ISPO as a state-backed effort to evade the more rigorous 
requirements for RSPO certification. However, there may be validity to the Indonesian 
government’s claim that RSPO certification is expensive and requires extensive 
documentation.94 It is out of reach for the thousands of illiterate small-scale farmers who 
sell their small output to the processing mills. Out of about 2000 plantations in 
Indonesia, less than 50 were certified by the RSPO in 2010. There was therefore real 
concern about whether Indonesia could produce enough certified palm oil.  
  
 Whether certification by the RSPO or the ISPO is effective in enforcing standards 
or merely enables scrutiny is a valid question for more empirical study. For present 
purposes, the point that this article seeks to make is that the Indonesian government 
would not have introduced the ISPO if not for the transnational regulatory pressure by 
transnational civil society and the EU biofuels scheme. The ISPO is not a response of 
weakness, of caving in to EU pressure. The ISPO is domestic regulation that, for all its 
flaws and weaknesses due to endemic problems of corruption and lax enforcement 
within the archipelago of a thousand islands, is created by a state (Indonesia) and 
tailored to meet its domestic circumstances. There is interaction between transnational 
norms and domestic factors that led to regulatory change in Indonesia. That is the 
essence of TEL. To argue that unilateralism is essentially economic bullying misses this 
subtle aspect of the regulatory dance that TEL sets in motion.  
 
 Scharpf has posited two main forms of legitimacy: input (process) and output 
(performance and effectiveness) legitimacy. From the viewpoint of output legitimacy, to 
the extent that a particular set of rules or standards promotes the common good, it 
should be seen to be legitimate; the process leading to the promulgation of a norm is 
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not pertinent to its legitimacy, and democracy has no role to play in fostering legitimacy. 
As Perez points out, under this account, “the question is rather which set of criteria 
constitutes the best expression of the common good”.95 The role of experts in 
determining these standards (and defining what “the common good” constitutes) and 
how private governance schemes build legitimacy through expertise has been the focus 
of numerous studies about standards in the literature. Jacobsson argues that standard-
setting organizations build legitimacy through presenting their standards as “expert 
knowledge stored in the form of rules”.96 Kerwer posits that a necessary (but not always 
sufficient) precondition for the effectiveness of standards is that the target audience(s) 
believe that the expertise on which the standards are based is convincing.97  
 
However, with declining trust in experts and their professed expertise, the power 
of “…expert knowledge to provide privileged accounts of the common good and, hence, 
to serve as a source and arbiter of legitimacy” has also declined.98 Instead, the 
conception of legitimacy that is gaining ascendency in contemporary global society is 
one that places emphasis on the process that leads to the production of a transnational 
norm, that is, input legitimacy. “[T]he legitimacy of transnational regimes is judged, 
increasingly, by the nature of the process that led to the regimes’ creation, and by the 
public accountability of those who implement them”.99 “As such, democratisation” is 
often viewed as the solution to the “legitimacy problem”.100 Held has observed that 
“[d]emocracy seems to have scored a historic victory over alternative forms of 
governance…[It] bestows an aura of legitimacy on modern political life: laws, rules and 
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policies appear justified when they are ‘democratic’”.101  
 
 Yet, the meaning of the concept of “democracy” in the transnational arena is 
highly contested. There is no consensus on what constitutes adequate participation and 
deliberation for a regulatory system to be deemed “democratic” and hence 
“legitimate”.102 Bernstein’s analytical framework highlights that a checklist of legitimacy 
requirements cannot be developed a priori because the concept of legitimacy is a 
shifting one, one that evolves over time and is also highly contingent on the interactions 
of power within social structures of affected communities.103  What many private 
authority schemes have sought to do is to include transparency and accountability 
mechanisms in their governance structures and rule making processes to further 
representative and deliberative democracy and thereby increase their input legitimacy. 
Meidinger suggests that this is a form of anticipatory democracy at work as these 
regulatory programmes aim to anticipate emergent public values, institute mechanisms 
to advance them and thereby enhance authority.104 The Forestry Stewardship Council 
(FSC) is often held up as the ‘poster child’ of treating transparency and stakeholder 
consultation as ends unto themselves.105 However, there is a “legitimacy trade off” 
which private authority schemes have to grapple with: high levels of participation and 
transparency increase support and buy-in, but also slow down decision-making 
processes and potentially impede timely action on policy problems.106 Auld and 
Gulbrandsen’s comparative study of the FSC and the Marine Stewardship Council shed 
light on how schemes may choose to design their institutional features differently to 
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address this trade-off.107  
 
Abbott and Snidal argue that these are “[p]ragmatic steps [that] constitute 
sensible approaches to developing democracy in an arena where the very meaning of 
the concept is in doubt; over time, they could have significant consequences for global 
democracy”.108 However, the jury is still out on this issue as more empirical evidence of 
how participation actually works in private regulatory schemes is needed.109 One 
indication, by Ponte and Cheyns, is that “sustaintability networks are far less inclusive, 
transparent and participatory than they portray themselves to be” as they manipulate 
who gets to participate and use subtle techniques to drown the voices of politically 
weaker actors.110 This article argues that the democratization of TEL, for example, 
through the creation of inclusive models of deliberation and public participation is a 
laudable objective in pursuit of the genuine aspiration to subject transnational issues to 
deliberation by all who are affected. However, this is a “work-in-progress” in pursuit of a 
moving target (that is, the shifting and contested notion of democracy in the 
transnational context). It is premature to conclude that TEL is illegitimate on this ground. 
It is an imperfect institutional design but has the potential to fill the gaps and 
inadequacies of traditional IEL.  
 
Part IV:  Conclusion 
 
  This article sought to outline the contours of the emerging concept of TEL. 
Part II of this article was devoted to providing a broad overview of the salient aspects of 
transnational law and how these aspects are carried over to TEL. In addition, this article 
advanced the argument that traditional IEL provides too narrow a set of ideas and 
concepts for environmental law scholars to engage effectively with contemporary 
environmental issues. Scholars who have sought to go beyond the state-centric foci of 
IEL have tended to draw from other disciplines like geography, political science and 
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anthropology. These endeavours have enriched and advanced the frontiers of 
environmental law scholarship. TEL offers another promising avenue for scholars 
seeking to venture beyond state-centred ideas of law to capture the realities of 
contemporary global social ordering.  
 
 Using the EU sustainable biofuels regime as a case study, this article showed 
how the EU is creating TEL by using market access to incentivise regulatory action 
abroad and by applying New Governance techniques at the transnational level. These 
courses of action are not without criticism, particularly of the legitimacy of trade-related 
unilateral action to advance environmental interests and the legitimacy of private 
regulation. While recognising the validity of these legitimacy concerns, this article 
argued for a more nuanced understanding of trade-related environmental measures. It 
was also argued that private regulation is by no means perfect, but the attempts made 
by roundtable certification schemes to promote inclusive and transparent decision-
making are laudable. An interim conclusion would be that it is too premature to strike 
TEL down on legitimacy grounds.  
 
 Biofuels poses significant governance challenges because of its numerous 
interfaces with pressing policy issues such as rural poverty, food security, agricultural 
policy and global finance. For an observer, what has been striking is the speed at which 
the policy discourse has shifted from unequivocal championing of biofuels as a silver 
bullet to one that weaves far more narratives that shed light on the social and 
environmental damage that can be caused by industrial biofuels production. These 
narratives bring to attention the plight of the oppressed, the marginalised, and the 
forgotten. The speed of this shift in discourse and consequent international policy is, in 
large part, due to transnational forces. Through the lenses of TEL, scholars may find a 
useful “vocabulary” to consider such developments and contribute towards developing 
fair and just solutions to global environmental challenges.  
 
